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Despite the uncertainties of Brexit, London continues to be rated as a leading location in Europe and the world 
for business, knowledge, and talent. It is routinely benchmarked among the top performing large cities globally 
in terms of quality of life, infrastructure and accessibility. 
But 30 years ago, when London had no citywide government, a transport system in crisis, and no successful track 
record of continuous large-scale upgrades to the urban fabric, this scenario would have seemed highly unlikely. 
In this essay we examine how London’s unpromising 1980s gave rise to three decades of reinvestment and we 
explain how the European Investment Bank played an essential catalytic role in successive cycles of London’s 
evolution from an under-governed de-populating national capital into a diverse global centre benefiting from 
integrated urban systems management.
Figure 1: Timeline of EIB’s cycles of investment and London’s population change
London’s development: the back story (1945 to 1985)
The 40 years between 1945 and 1985 saw London take several steps to reorient its spatial and economic composition 
in accordance with new global political and economic trends.
Rail lines, tunnels, a revamped Underground, and bigger, better 
airports were decisive in London’s transformation into one of the 
world’s great global centres. Direct project loans from the 
European Investment Bank worth £7.3 billion between 2006 
and 2016 have also been of fundamental importance.
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Following World War II, with extensive derelict areas in the city, London had an opportunity to amend the perceived 
failings of unplanned and haphazard development that had occurred as a result of rapid industrialisation over 
the course of the nineteenth century. With over 50,000 inner London homes having been completely destroyed 
and more than 2 million having experienced at least some form of bomb damage, the London County Council 
(LCC) was presented with a unique chance to plan and rebuild vacant parts of the city on a scale not witnessed 
since the Great Fire of London almost three centuries prior.1 
In 1944, the Greater London Plan (“The Abercrombie Plan”) pointed out the main directions for the development 
and reconstruction of the city. Founded on the realities of industrial dispersal and a stable population with low 
levels of growth, the plan demanded not only the creation of large-scale affordable housing, including tower 
blocks, but also the dispersal and relocation of populations into New Towns beyond a newly established metropolitan 
green belt.2 By the mid-1960s, London had witnessed the creation of eight satellite New Towns, a viable green 
belt, and more than 1,000 high-rise blocks of flats scattered across the urban fabric.3
Moreover, the emergence of several significant and enduring phenomena signaled that London had reached the 
end of this first cycle of post-war development. The “leapfrog” of development over the green belt had seen New 
Towns become heavily dominated by commuter living, while high-rise blocks had begun to decay, physically and 
socially. Moreover, London’s inner-city boroughs had begun to witness rapid depopulation, as white working-class 
inhabitants started to migrate to distant suburbs or adjacent counties in search of a better quality of life and new 
job opportunities.4
In this context, where deindustrialisation, urban blight and land contamination hit London hard, urban redevelopment 
(or renewal) gradually came to be identified as the task of re-engineering the city for new forms of economic 
activity and job creation. It was increasingly accepted that economic activity had to be re-galvanised on sites 
where it had declined most, namely in the rapidly deindustrialising waterfront areas in the east and south of the 
city that had suffered due to the movement of cargo to deeper ports in Tilbury and Folkestone. Infrastructure 
interventions came to be seen as an initial solution to these imbalances, helping to concentrate development in 
the east of the city and offset the traditional advantages of the west. But the city’s governance arrangements, still 
based on the geographically constrained London County Council (usually known as “inner London”), were not up 
to the task.5
In 1965, the Greater London Council (GLC) was created to address London’s fragmented and uncoordinated local 
government and deliver on the need for new infrastructure development. Replacing the LCC, the GLC became 
responsible for running strategic services such as waste disposal and emergency planning, and shared responsibility 
with London boroughs for providing roads, housing, planning and leisure services. The GLC was also required to 
produce a Greater London Development Plan.6 
A draft Development Plan was published in 1969 and approved in 1976.7 In contrast to the Greater London Plan 
of 1944, this Development Plan focused on inner-London regeneration, assumed a decline in population, and 
established clearly defined density limits.8 A key focus of the plan was the regeneration and comprehensive 
redevelopment of Covent Garden and the creation of a central London motorway loop in order to enhance 
connectivity to the suburbs. Following the movement of the Covent Garden market to Nine Elms, the GLC proposed 
the construction of a new road system through the area, which would involve demolishing over three-quarters 
of the area’s homes to make space for new and more expensive flats. Residents and community groups met the 
proposal with criticism. As a result, the plan ultimately became mired in controversy and dispute.9
In 1961, the UK had applied to join the European Economic Community. It became a member in 1973, a situation 
that was then ratified in a 1975 referendum won by 67% to 33%. 
In 1981, the Labour Party took control of the GLC and pledged to implement an interventionist Industrial Strategy 
capable of producing 10,000 jobs by 1985. This was a direct response to the massive scale of the decline in the 
city’s manufacturing base that had been occurring since the 1960s. Between 1959 and 1975, the rate of manufacturing 
job loss in London was more than double that in other UK conurbations put together. In the decade from 1971-81 
Greater London lost 36% of its manufacturing employment compared to 25% nationally.10 
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Together with the London Labour Plan, which aimed to combat discrimination, enforce equal opportunities, and 
strengthen unionisation, the London Industrial Strategy was highly novel in nature. It introduced a publicly appealing 
notion of democratic planning into the heart of economic policy. It also placed for the first time an emphasis on 
individual industrial and service sectors and the pursuit of particular production priorities.
By 1984, Labour Party leadership of the GLC had established borough housing targets, a 70% public sector housing 
target, and the objective that 80% of the capital’s houses would have gardens.11 In pursuit of a new “rainbow 
coalition” base for the London Labour Party, the GLC had also subsidised an array of community groups and 
minority support activities. A radicalised GLC therefore found itself increasingly at odds with the economically 
liberal ideals espoused by Margaret Thatcher’s central government – a factor which ultimately led to the council’s 
abolition in 1986 (see below).12 
The first cycle – (1985-1992): the teething pains of post-industrial 
London
The 1980s was a decade in which London’s industrial sector mix and its long-term population trends experienced 
a dramatic shift. The opening up of the Eurodollar markets, and the rise of the dollar as the global currency of 
choice for international transactions had seen London begin to emerge as an offshore banking centre for dollar 
deposits. The abandonment of exchange controls in 1979 allowed foreign banks in New York, Tokyo and Paris 
to lend, borrow, buy, sell, merge and acquire assets in London, while reforms to equity markets meant funds 
could now look for the best possible return across global markets. London’s financial sector was poised for 
growth, and the London economy substantially de-coupled from the UK national industrial pattern. 
The subsequent reforms that comprised the final “Big Bang” of deregulation in 1986 saw many financial firms 
double or triple their workforce within a year, and London quickly established itself as one of the world’s three 
global financial centres, benefiting from its strategic location in the European and African time zone and proximity 
to European markets.13 The growth in size and number of financial and commercial institutions demanded a 
supporting ecosystem of professional and technology services. This caused a long-term shift in London’s 
employment geography that persists to this day. The re-urbanisation of jobs back into central London triggered 
wider processes of urban regeneration. Meanwhile deregulation in the TV, newspapers and film sectors saw 
London develop a highly specialised and flexible set of media roles which would drive further economic 
diversification and re-urbanisation.14
Most of London government and business did not anticipate the scale of opportunities that the Big Bang in 
financial services, the deregulation of media and information, and the associated new technologies, would 
bring. London as a whole was largely unprepared, economically, spatially and infrastructurally, for the growth 
that would follow. Although the economy was growing strongly, and London’s population was stabilising after 
more than 40 years of steady decline, the city’s governance system was entering a period of crisis. As one of 
the crucibles of entrenched political division between Labour and Conservative politicians, Greater London 
was the victim of the tensions between the defiant Labour leadership of the GLC and an uncompromising 
Conservative central government. Service delivery and decision-making became increasingly paralysed.15 
In 1986 the UK central government took the decision to abolish the GLC, dissolving the institution notionally 
best placed to coordinate London’s metropolitan growth. It left London to be governed by 33 weakly coordinated 
local boroughs, each with their own short-term agendas, and a centralised national government reluctant to 
substantiate its occasional strategic guidance with more robust powers of implementation.16 The abolition 
represented a high watermark in the centralisation of UK government, and a low point in London’s self-governing 
capacity. 
It was in this context that the EIB’s contribution in London began to pick up. In the first 12 years of the EIB’s 
investments in the UK, the main London project had only been a modest €17 million investment in the Second 
Dartford Tunnel, but in the mid-1980s London’s infrastructure deficits began to appear more urgent. 
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The initial focus was on London’s transport to other European countries, as part of a step up in the priority 
accorded to European transport connectivity. The EIB had observed the European Community’s urgency to 
establish a multi-modal network for the free flow of goods and services, and London’s airports were a key part 
of this equation.17
Timeline of EIB investments in London, 1986-2018
 Between 1986 and 1987, the EIB provided a loan of 
€11.2 million to help fund the construction of London 
City Airport in the Royal Docks area of East London.18 
In 1987, the EIB loaned €210 million to help fund the 
construction of a second terminal at Gatwick Airport.19 
And between 1988 and 1989, the EIB loaned a further 
€304 million to help fund the construction of a second 
terminal at Stansted Airport.20 These airport projects 
substantially improved London’s international 
connectivity. They also supported London’s 
development as a polycentric region where many of 
the R&D, innovation and high-end services functions 
are located beyond the M25 near the city’s airports, 
especially in the M4 corridor and the London Stansted 
Cambridge Corridor.21
Meanwhile the long-awaited Channel Tunnel project 
finally got going through a new financing solution. 
Beginning in 1988, the EIB lent €600 million to co-fund 
the construction of the Eurotunnel connection 
between the UK and France. At the time this was the 
first build-operate-transfer project in UK history and 
the country’s most expensive tunnel construction 
project ever proposed. The EIB was initially an 
instrumental partner. It became more significantly 
involved when the UK government refused to subsidise 
the project and instead agreed through the Anglo-
French Treaty that it would be funded entirely with 
private equity. The EIB was one of five banks plus ten 
contractors. The British Channel Tunnel Group consisted of two banks and five construction companies, while its 
French counterpart, France-Manche, consisted of three banks and five construction companies.22 
In the end, the UK government granted a debt guarantee and agreed a concession for a period of 55 years (later 
extended to 65 years).23 A Railways Usage Contract provides Eurotunnel’s only committed source of income. Under 
the contract, Eurotunnel is required to make half of the tunnel capacity available to British, French and Belgian 
railways for Eurostar and freight trains, and in return the railways pay a fixed charge and tolls based on the volume 
of traffic plus a contribution to operating costs.24 In 1985 prices, the project was forecast to cost £5.5 billion, but 
the final cost came in at £9 billion, even though the 1987 financing package contained a 25% cushion.25 Cost 
overruns were attributed to slow tunneling and underestimation of the cost of the rolling stock.26
The EIB also began what would become a two-decade investment in the regeneration of the London Docklands, 
the largest redevelopment site in the city. It was overseen by London Docklands Development Corporation, an 
agency financed by UK central government. The property firm, Olympia and York, decided to build Canary Wharf 
in 1987, and the Development Corporation had already fast-tracked a new road strategy to build some £650 million 
of new roads by 1993, including the one-mile Limehouse Link tunnel, the most expensive road ever built in 
Britain.27 The EIB’s involvement was key to expanding the role of public transport in the area.
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The Docklands Light Railway had already opened Stage 1 in 1987, and powers were granted for the Beckton 
extension in 1989 to trigger development further east, with the EIB making an important initial investment amounting 
to over €300 million. A city extension to Bank station was also under way, funded by the emerging Canary Wharf 
project. Campaigning led by South London Lewisham Council triggered a Light Railway extension providing direct 
cross-river access to Canary Wharf. In the absence of a citywide government, the willingness of local boroughs 
and new City Challenge agencies to find £10 million helped to persuade Roger Freeman MP (Minister of State for 
Transport) to allow a parliamentary bill for the Light Railway Lewisham project in 1990.  
The other major project begun during this phase was Barking Power Station. Constructed between 1992 and 
1995, it was the first large generating station to be built in London for decades. It became one of the largest 
independently owned generating plants in the UK, capable of generating 1,000 MW of electricity, well over 10% 
of the peak electricity demand in London.28 The EIB investment of £200 million thereby ensured that London’s 
power capacity needs were met for a significant time.
In a period in which London was experiencing benign neglect and the infrastructure deficits had become quite 
severe, the EIB’s initial surge in investment in airport, rail and power projects was a source of important momentum 
even before the transformational effects of the demise of the Soviet Union, German re-unification, and deeper 
European integration. Much more was to come as more of London’s distributed leadership system began to 
recognise a changed context of opportunities for London and an urgent set of competitive risks and investment 
imperatives.
The second cycle (1992-2000): preparing for a global and competitive 
London
Five years after the abolition of the GLC, and in the midst of a new recession, London saw the emergence of a 
number of institutions and leadership platforms with a new perspective for the city: conscious of the need to 
compete, aware of the new population growth and internationalisation, and concerned about the ever-growing 
infrastructure deficit.
A sequence of reports focused attention on potential reforms to London’s infrastructure model. The 1989 Central 
London Rail Study highlighted the collapse in infrastructure spending in the face of growing demand, and two 
years later the London Planning Advisory Committee, set up to advise central government, produced a seminal 
report entitled London - World City Moving in the 21st Century. The report articulated the aspirations and needs of 
London as a city with global functions, which required improved infrastructure, quality of place, culture, and 
international promotion.29
These reports were purely advisory, but they influenced central government to provide more targeted support 
for its capital. The Conservative Party was encouraged to feature London in its manifesto for the 1992 election 
for the first time, and since then the needs of London have featured in all of the winning manifestos in UK elections. 
In 1991 a Cabinet Committee for London was set up to improve central government coordination, and this was 
then followed by a Government Office for London, and a Minister for Transport for London.30
While the Government Office for London had a limited budget of around £1 billion and rarely made policy initiatives, 
it helped to allocate regeneration funds and capital expenditure. The Office acted as a key point of contact for 
private and public actors in London, including the EIB, and encouraged a positive approach to the new cycle of 
economic opportunities.31
In these years the upswing in demand to live in London caught the city’s governing institutions unaware, given 
that the city’s population had previously been forecast to fall to just six million. Re-urbanisation pressed the city’s 
neglected transport infrastructure and disinvested public services. After decades of largely failed experiments in 
high-rise social housing, London also faced the imperative to physically and socially renew much of its urban 
fabric.
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What followed was the gradual triumph of a new attitude of pragmatism and informal partnership among local 
and national governments and the private sector. Inner city boroughs controlled by the Labour Party recognised 
the opportunities of using business growth and new sources of investment for social objectives and public goods 
(housing, amenities, jobs and transport).32 Local councils became more supportive of accommodating professional 
talent and began to lobby for investments in place-making, education and infrastructure, hoping to use them to 
fulfil broader social goals. During the 1990s, the boroughs began to cooperate with each other again and articulate 
common positions, leaving behind the bipartisanship of the 1980s.  
The 1990s also saw business and civic leaders organise themselves more effectively to fill some of the governance 
vacuum. London First was established in 1992 as a business membership organisation that advocated new solutions 
for the city. It was invited to produce a strategic vision for London in partnership with business and the boroughs. 
This resulted in the prospectus called the London Pride Partnership. While non-binding, the vision heavily influenced 
government thinking on London and inspired a policy agenda focused on place-based regeneration that was 
persuasive to the EIB and other investors. By raising awareness of London’s strategic weaknesses and providing 
viable pathways and solutions, these organisations created the context in which there was an opportunity to 
pursue megaprojects in London.33
One of the most important, the Jubilee Line Extension to Stratford, catalysed the growth of Canary Wharf. In 
the early 1990s the isolated Docklands project had gone bankrupt and the ability of London’s new “second central 
business district” to meet its high job targets was considered to rest on much improved connectivity to central 
London, well beyond the additional capacity provided by the Docklands Light Railway. Olympia and York, the 
developers in charge of the multi-billion-pound office development, had been one of the principal proponents 
of an underground link between central London and the Docklands. In 1993, O & Y reached an agreement with 
London Underground Ltd to provide £398 million in private funding towards the Jubilee Line Extension – almost 
half of the £800 million private contribution that was initially required for the project to get the go-ahead. But a 
property market slump soon put O&Y into administration, meaning their contribution to the project had to be 
significantly reduced. A new source of finance was critical.34
In 1993, the EIB came up with a £98 million loan to the Canary Wharf developers to help cover the first private 
sector contribution towards the cost of the project. This EIB loan was ultimately hailed as the final piece of the 
jigsaw that allowed the Jubilee Line Extension to go ahead.35 The extension lengthened the Jubilee Line from 
Green Park to Stratford through the South Bank and to the East End of London.36 It was one of London’s largest 
engineering projects to date. It involved the construction of six completely new stations and the enlargement or 
rebuilding of a further five. At its final cost of over £4 million per metre, it was one of the most expensive construction 
projects in the world at the time.37 
The Jubilee Line Extension had a number of important immediate urban development benefits: 
• It provided two extra strategic river crossings for the area, firmly anchoring it to the rest of the Docklands.
• It catalysed the wider regeneration of the Docklands by encouraging and supporting the proposed housing 
and office scheme.
• It relieved road traffic on river crossings, particularly the Blackwall Tunnel.
• It provided the large SE London population with access to the growing employment north of the river.38
The project also achieved several notable effects on the economy and commuter times along the line. Upon 
opening, the extension removed approximately 3,300-person trips per day from the local road network and saved 
14.4 million hours in travel time in its first full year of operation. From 1991 to 2001, the population in the catchment 
area of extension stations rose by 31% compared to 11% in the inner East London area as a whole. And by 1998 
employment in the extension catchment areas was growing at nearly twice the rate of the rest of Greater London.39
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The extension marked a watershed moment in the development of a co-financing approach to London’s redevelopment 
projects. The ability of local actors and business to persuade central government to support investment in the 
Docklands Light Railway and the Jubilee Line Extension was critical to convincing the EIB to contribute alongside 
other private investment. This period of the mid-1990s was also one of increased negotiation and pragmatism in 
London leadership. As such the London Dockland Development Corporation also became more receptive to calls 
for mixed land uses in the Docklands development, with more of the residential, cultural and service amenities 
sought by the local boroughs. As a result, the Docklands redevelopment project gained vibrancy and gathered 
momentum, and by the late 1990s Canary Wharf had fully established itself as London’s “second central business 
district”. This experience powerfully demonstrated the benefits of private and public cooperation, especially 
around the advocacy and assembly of investment, with the EIB playing a central role.40
Throughout the decade London’s newly confident growth coalition successfully lobbied central government to 
fund many other high-profile projects to support the city’s growth, via national regeneration programmes and 
lottery funds. Although not fully anchored in a wider strategy, the model of using public infrastructure investment 
to unlock private finance helped deliver a sequence of “Millennium projects”, including the Tate Modern, Millennium 
Bridge, Millennium Dome and Millennium Wheel (London Eye). Areas of the ‘City Fringe’ were also upgraded with 
public funding, paving the way for the cultural and creative revival of Hoxton and Shoreditch. 
Alongside these cultural projects, London’s new financing approach helped to accelerate many initiatives, including 
rail connections to airports, airport terminal expansions, station redevelopments, new shopping districts and 
market places. Put together, these projects secured much needed infrastructure and amenity improvements, 
helping to shift more people onto public transport, reduce congestion and enable London’s new job clusters to 
spill over beyond the historic central business district.41 One of the most important projects was the rapid airport 
link, the Heathrow Express. In 1997, the EIB lent £125 million for the construction of the project (as did the Export-
Import Bank of Japan), a £300 million, 70:30 joint venture between BAA and British Rail. The project involved the 
upgrading and electrification of 18 km of existing railway, plus the construction of a new 7 km spur, two new 
stations and a maintenance depot, new signaling and communications works and the purchasing of new high-
speed trains. The project helped cut the journey time from Heathrow to central London to 15 minutes. Given that 
before its construction 80% of travelers to and from the airport used road transport, the Heathrow Express also 
had a significant impact on reducing congestion and air pollution on surrounding roads.42 
“The EIB is pleased to support this key project which will improve access and travel conditions for passengers at Europe’s 
busiest international airport. The Heathrow Express will add yet another crucial link to the trans-European communications 
networks – whose development is a European Union priority – and it will also improve the London urban environment 
by helping to reduce road congestion.”
Sir Brian Unwin, EIB President 1993-1999.43
The improvement of London’s connectivity to the trans-European rail network had been a major EIB priority for 
more than a decade, and this effort was eventually realised through the Channel Tunnel Rail Link. From its initial 
design phases in 1996 to the final phase of construction and opening in 2007, the EIB invested £700 million in the 
high-speed project. Section 1 of the rail link, from the Channel Tunnel to North Kent, opened in 2003.44 For this 
stage, the EIB loan to concessionaire London and Continental Railways had a maturity of up to 30 years, while 
other key shareholders included Bechtel Ltd., London Electricity plc, National Express Group plc, SNCF, and UBS 
Warburg. The completion of section 1 resulted in an immediate jump in London’s international connectivity, 
reducing the journey time to reach Paris and Brussels by 20 minutes, and thus impacting on the overall time to 
reach other key European cities such as Amsterdam and Cologne that can be accessed via onward connections.45 
By providing international rail users with time savings and increased service reliability, it has also contributed to 
improving the competitiveness of rail relative to air and road transport.46 
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Section 2 of the project involved the construction of the line from North Kent to the central London terminus at 
St. Pancras, so that there is now a 109 km twin track high-passenger and freight line between London and the 
Channel Tunnel.47 This part of the project was especially complex as it involved the construction of 25 km of 
tunnels under London and the River Thames, as well as a new international station at Stratford that has contributed 
to urban regeneration in the East London and East Thames areas and major reconstruction works at St. Pancras. 
The completion of section 2 also provided a further 15-minute time gain on the journey between London and 
Paris/Brussels and released scarce capacity on South London commuter routes. The Tunnel Link now has the 
capacity to carry up to between 40 and 45 million passengers per year and has contributed to the rise of long-
distance inter-city and international commuting in Europe.48
The first pilots of social housing investment
In 1998 the EIB began providing support in the social housing sector as part of an integrated approach to urban 
development and renewal. Its finance to The UK Housing Finance Corporation enabled the debt aggregator to 
on-lend at no charge to a number of London’s Registered Social Landlords in deprived areas of London (e.g. 
initially Tower Hamlets and Hackney) and other UK cities. This resulted in the creation of thousands of units of 
replacement social housing, as well as “foyer” buildings to shelter and train jobless young people, and “live-work” 
units for start-up businesses. 
This new role for the EIB allowed it to provide highly cost-effective long-term finance for housing associations to 
underpin the delivery of very energy efficient affordable homes as part of wider urban renewal processes in the 
city, offering confidence for providers to embark on new projects. This had a transformative impact on regeneration 
projects across Inner and Outer London over the subsequent 20 years (see Section 4). By the 2010s, the financing 
of social housing as the anchor of a larger urban renewal process had become mainstream, with the EIB as the 
key source of financial innovation in the sector. By 2016 this investment had totalled £4.2 billion spanning 40 projects 
in the UK, an outsized share of which were in London.
The third cycle (2001-2008): London’s new metropolitan functions and 
the opportunity for financial innovation
In 1997, the incoming New Labour government decided to restore metropolitan government for London. This 
reflected a newfound confidence that the capital had moved on from an era of political hostility and brinksmanship 
and could now be trusted to manage its relationships and its finances prudently.49 The government’s Green Paper 
confirmed that a directly elected Mayor would feature in the capital’s new governance arrangements. London 
was set to gain a new kind of governance system that had never been seen in a British city. 
In 2000 the Greater London Authority (GLA) was set up, with a Mayor at its head, coordinating the work with the 
33 boroughs. Importantly, the Mayor gained powers over transport through the new subsidiary agency, Transport 
for London, as well as strategic planning and economic development powers via the London Development Agency. 
Policing and fire services were also transferred. From 2002 a Sustainable Development Commission was established, 
advising the Mayor on environmental strategies and priorities.50
The Mayor-Assembly model of the GLA initially had a modest staff (around 400), and its powers were at first 
focused on city wide strategy and the management of transport and policing. Although the GLA and Mayor 
elaborated transport, spatial, economic and housing strategies, the institution’s financial and legislative autonomy 
was somewhat limited. However, the integration of functions increased the capacity of Transport for London to 
borrow money and convene PPPs. This resulted in a rapid sequence of major investments with the EIB playing a 
core role.
In March 1998, the British Deputy Prime Minister announced a public-private partnership (PPP) for the London 
Underground. The objective was to develop a better underground system through an efficient public sector 
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operator working with an enhanced infrastructure managed by the private sector. A PPP was thought to be best 
suited to reversing the deterioration of the system caused by a sustained period of underfunding. (By 1998, the 
value of the backlog of work arising from past under-investment amounted to £1.2 billion).51 
Under the PPP, London Underground was divided into a publicly owned operating company responsible for 
delivering services to the public, London Underground Limited, and three private sector infrastructure companies 
to provide services under contract to the system. Each Infraco, as the infrastructure companies were known, was 
responsible for a set of three groups of underground lines. 30-year contracts were signed with the Infracos to 
maintain, improve and upgrade these lines; the private sector was invited to bid for the acquisition of shares in 
the Infracos.52 As such, while the operator remained publicly owned, the maintenance and renewal programmes 
were carried out by privately run companies.53 The overarching idea was that instead of having conventional 
contracts whereby the public body, the Underground, simply specified the work and put it out to tender, contractors 
would be incentivised to take a longer-term view of the assets.54 In 2002 and 2003, London Underground Ltd 
signed three 30-year agreements with the Tube Lines and Metronet consortia.55 
With very few private sector bidders willing to participate, the cost of setting up the contracts rapidly increased.56 
The EIB committed to supporting the consortia, loaning £300 million to Tube Lines and £600 million to Metronet.57 
In the case of Metronet, the underlying financial structure included £70 million in equity from five shareholders, 
commercial bank loans worth £1 billion, and a further £1 billion of bonds alongside the EIB loan. 
The PPP model was soon extended to other transport projects. For Transport for London, loans from the EIB have 
often proved cheaper than alternatives such as the UK’s Public Works Loan Board. In 2005, the EIB agreed to 
provide a loan of £100 million to extend the Docklands Light Railway to provide a new transport link across 
the River Thames and connect North Woolwich to Woolwich Arsenal in South London. The project was delivered 
by means of a PPP. EIB funds were lent directly to the private concessionaire Woolwich Arsenal Rail Enterprises 
Ltd., which was responsible for designing, constructing and maintaining the extension under as part of a 30-year 
concession granted by the Light Railway, itself owned by Transport for London. As with other projects at this time, 
it was financed by a combination of commercial bank loans, the EIB loan and junior subordinated loan stock/
ordinary shares.58
The emergence of an integrated planning capability for London heralded a larger scale set of projects to come 
forward than at any time in the 1990s, especially for the activation of East London. In 2004, London’s first comprehensive 
spatial strategy since 1945 was published, entitled the London Plan. With a strong focus on managing population 
growth, it became a “strategy of strategies”, identifying more than 30 “Opportunity Areas” where London could 
increase housing supply, mostly in the East and North-East. The London Plan has not only enabled a dramatic 
increase in housing densities in London and has enshrined the principle of sustainable transport-oriented 
development.59 It also set the framework for a number, of transport, urban development, regeneration and housing 
projects to come together, many with EIB assistance.
Soon after the London Plan was released, the EIB signed off on a £450 million loan to help cover the cost of an 
extension to the East London Line and overall upgrading of the London Overground orbital network.60 This 
project involved the construction of a 4 km new trackbed from Whitechapel to Dalston, four new stations (at 
Shoreditch, High Street Hoxton, Haggerston and Dalston), the refurbishment of 14 stations, replacement of 7.5 km 
of track, and installation of signaling equipment.61 The project cost around £1 billion in total and was completed 
in two phases. Phase 1 funding came mainly from the EIB loan, while the second phase was co-funded by the 
Department for Transport, which contributed £64 million, and Transport for London, which contributed £11 million.62 
The EIB’s involvement in the project was intended to promote the regeneration of the deprived areas of East 
London through which the line runs. The project was also designed to enhance inter-suburb connectivity, as 
demand for this kind of travel has been steadily rising since the mid-2000s. As of the completion of the project, 
the overground network also connected 20 of London’s 33 boroughs.63 
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“The EIB has been an incredibly important source of funding for us over the years. We have credit lines with them worth 
over £3.5 billion, of which we have drawn £2.5 billion, and they have also been a lender into the majority of PFIs or rolling 
stock leases over time, so very, very important.”
Simon Kilonback (Director of Group Treasury, Transport for London), 2017.
Map of key projects co-financed by the EIB, 1986-2018
Other private finance initiatives were also agreed for hospitals and road infrastructure. In 2006, the EIB signed off 
on a £250 million loan to support the redevelopment of the Royal London Hospital in Whitechapel and Bart’s 
Hospital in West Smithfield as part of the largest hospital redevelopment project in the UK. The project itself was 
delivered through a PPP. The project’s promoter was Bart’s Hospital and the London NHS Trust, while EIB funds 
were provided to the special purpose company Capital Hospitals Ltd., the concessionaire which, through subcontractors, 
was charged with providing building facilities, non-clinical services and maintenance over the lifetime of the 
concession. Overall, the innovative financing for the project was derived from a mixture of £1 billion in senior 
bonds, the EIB loan, a mezzanine loan and junior subordinated loan stocks and ordinary shares provided by the 
shareholders of Capital Hospitals.64 
The EIB also agreed a loan for £400 million to help cover the cost of widening the M25 motorway over 60 km 
between junctions 16 and 23 and 27 and 30 to four lanes, and maintenance works on the M25 network and 
associated strategic road links in and out of London totaling 400 km.65 The project itself was delivered as a PPP. 
Connect Plus, a special purpose concession, procured £185 million directly from the EIB and a further £215 million 
that was counter-guaranteed by commercial banks in the construction period. The Highways Agency awarded 
Connect Plus a contract worth £6.2 billion to design, build, finance and operate the motorway for 30 years. The 
improvement of the M25 was seen as essential to securing the future economic prosperity of the London region 
and the country as a whole. The project was also designed to result in improved and more reliable journey times, 
a reduction in congestion, and faster-flowing traffic at the Dartford Crossing.66 
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The fourth cycle (2009-present): larger scale and diversified investments 
to manage the consequences of London’s success
The most recent cycle has seen EIB investment in London become even more diversified and on a larger scale 
than ever before. This partly reflects the incremental adjustments to the GLA’s powers in 2007, 2011 and 2015 that 
have given more powers to the Mayor and GLA in climate action policy, planning and housing. Since 2012, a 
London Enterprise Panel comprised of boroughs, leading businesses and Transport for London representatives 
has provided intelligence, forecasting and advice to the city’s economic and skills strategies, and has allocated a 
wide range of higher tier funds to projects across the city.67 Over time, London has been able to prepare the most 
ambitious set of strategic plans of any British city – from economic development, to spatial to environment and 
cultural strategies. This has provided the confidence to long-term investors to consider a wider range of projects 
and asset classes.
In 2009, the EIB committed to providing its largest loan in London, a £1 billion loan to help fund the construction 
of Crossrail, Europe’s largest infrastructure project. The EIB loan was to be drawn down over six years by Transport 
for London to provide funding to its Crossrail Ltd. subsidiary.68 The total project cost is around £15 billion and is 
a new kind of financial package for transport megaprojects in the UK in that it is being met partially by London 
business rates, developer contributions, and future fare revenue. Over 60% of the project’s funding is to come 
from Londoners and London businesses that benefit substantially. The EIB loan has helped Transport for London 
be an effective co-financing partner.
Crossrail is providing London with a 10% boost to its rail capacity. With a capacity of 36,000 passengers per hour, 
the line is set to accommodate an estimated ridership of 200 million passengers per year. It will also reduce 
congestion and pollution and connect businesses in the three central business districts of the West End, the City 
and Canary Wharf with the outer East and West suburbs and with Heathrow Airport. 
“Crossrail is the largest construction project in Europe and will make an important contribution to London’s economy. 
By providing a much-needed boost to rail capacity in London and the South East, Crossrail will help to develop London 
as a sustainable world city by reducing congestion and pollution for the benefit of Londoners, commuters and visitors. 
It will also link London more efficiently into the European and global transport networks.”
Simon Brooks, EIB Vice-President, 2006-2012.69
The second phase of Crossrail’s development involved the purchasing of a new fleet of high-capacity, air-conditioned 
trains and the construction of a new train maintenance depot. To help fund this second phase, in 2013 the EIB 
committed to providing a further £500 million loan.70 The overall £1 billion bill for Crossrail trains is to be met 
entirely by the public purse. The government decided that attempts to secure private financing risked delaying 
the project beyond its projected end date of 2018. 
The mainstreaming of support for social and affordable housing
In the first decade of London’s new governance system, the role of the Mayor and the GLA was largely to win 
investment and policy support from central government and the private sector that aligned with the city’s broader 
strategies. This was achieved to great effect when London won the right to host the 2012 Olympic Games, which 
unlocked a whole cycle of investment to deliver substantial regeneration around Stratford and the Lower Lea 
Valley already under way.71
In 2009 the EIB offered a major loan to build the Olympic Village and social housing after the Olympic Delivery 
Authority failed to raise the £1bn needed from the private sector. The EIB signed a £95 million loan to Triathlon 
Homes LLP to support the pre-purchase and retrofit of 1,379 athletes’ flats into affordable new homes for East 
London residents under the auspices of the Delivery Authority, backed also by national housing agency funding.72 
This funding added much-needed stock to the London housing market.
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“The creation of sustainable communities is a key lending objective for the EIB. The Bank is particularly encouraged by 
the high environmental standards in place in the Athletes’ Village development and we are confident that this project 
will have a significant positive impact on the quality of life of the families and individuals who will live there following 
the Games in 2012.”
Simon Brooks, EIB Vice-President, 2006-2012.73
In many respects the EIB’s role in the Olympic project illustrates how, in London, the more recent generation of 
projects has become oriented to social and environmental outcomes to a greater extent than the original Docklands 
redevelopment had been. Physical change in many cases has been recognised as a means to raise the aspirations 
and expectations of whole communities and the governance system as a whole, and regeneration projects have 
become sites of public debate about what the desirable future for London is.
Social housing has grown as a key EIB area of activity in London. The Olympics social housing investment was far 
from the only project of its kind. As well as continuing its partnership with the Housing Finance Corporation 
established in 1998, the EIB expanded its direct lending to the largest and most creditworthy social landlords in 
London where investment programmes best matched its priorities. This was especially welcome as Housing 
Associations had been more eager to borrow from the EIB – historically, the availability of Public Works Loan Board 
funds had supplied councils with highly competitive “quasi-gilt” interest rates, but an increase in rates made the 
EIB’s interest rates more attractive. 
The scale of EIB investment increased. In 2016 the EIB invested two tranches of £500m funding into social housing 
in the UK which was matched by a further £1 billion from the Housing Finance Corporation. The initiative offered 
finance to some of London’s largest housing associations in order to accelerate the building of affordable homes 
in the city.74 The £2 billion loan was granted over a 30-year term and represented the largest ever support for 
social housing by the EIB anywhere in Europe.
The EIB also began working directly with leading housing associations. Home Group secured £75 million for the 
Rayners Lane regeneration in 2008, and later Sanctuary Housing Association applied for a £350 million direct loan 
from the EIB to a UK housing association – the biggest direct loan since 2008. The latter project allowed Sanctuary 
to build 5,000 social and affordable housing properties and refurbish and retrofit many others. Throughout this 
process, the EIB’s representatives took steps to reassure the Housing Associations that they were easy and pragmatic 
to work with.75 Meanwhile a number of London councils also benefited directly from EIB funding in this period 
for their housing schemes combined with other projects – they included Enfield Council for its high profile £1.5 billion 
Meridian Water project.
Innovating to support London’s growth management 
During the two decades of London’s maturing negotiated governance of the 1990s and 2000s, the EIB played a 
critical role in enabling London to upgrade its transport, improve its systems, and unlock new corridors and centres 
of growth. But the weight of demand London has experienced means that new growth management issues have 
arisen over time that have required further investment and innovation. The expansion and maturity of London’s 
metropolitan government powers has enabled an extension of the EIB’s investment portfolio in the city. In particular, 
a focus on the green economy, enterprise, housing and the knowledge economy has become prominent to support 
London’s sustainable development.
A big landmark was reached when the EIB agreed its first multi-sector engagement with a group of local authorities 
in London, supported by the GLA. The London Green Fund is a £120 million fund set up to invest in schemes 
that help London to reduce its carbon emissions while also creating jobs. The fund was launched in 2009 by the 
Mayor of London and the European Commissioner for Regional Policy, and it is managed by the EIB on behalf of 
the GLA and the London Waste and Recycling Board. The co-invested fund is made up of £50 million from the 
London ERDF programme, £32 million from the GLA, £18 million from the Waste and Recycling Board, and £10 
million from private funding at the project level. It provides capital for three Urban Development Funds that invest 
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directly in waste, energy efficiency, decentralised energy and social housing projects. They are essentially revolving 
investment funds, where money invested in one project is repaid and then reinvested in other projects. As of the 
end of 2015, the London Green Fund had committed all of the funds allocated and invested in 18 projects with a 
value of over £500 million, with EIB co-financing of around £200 million.76
The original London Green Fund financing model
At the same time, the EIB’s relationship 
with Transport for London continued to 
advance and mature. Transport for 
London already had several corporate 
loan agreements with the EIB as well as 
EIB loans to its PPP/PFI project companies, 
before in 2015, it agreed with the EIB a 
record £1 billion loan to upgrade the 
capital’s transport network.77 The five-
year, £10 billion investment programme 
will involve upgrades at Victoria and Bank 
stations, renewal of tracks and points of 
drainage on over 60 miles of the 
underground network, including 11 miles 
of tunnels, the construction of a network 
of cycle paths throughout the capital, 
and modernisation of signaling systems. 
The project is transforming passenger access to two of the capital’s busiest stations and interchanges that are set 
to increase much further in demand. The EIB loan is being paid back over a period of 35 years.78 
“The European Investment Bank is committed to supporting investment to improve sustainable urban transport across 
Europe and around the world. Continued investment in London’s transport network is essential in addressing the changing 
and increasing transport needs in Europe’s largest and fastest growing city.”
Jonathan Taylor, EIB Vice-President.79
The overhaul of London’s aging utility systems has been area of attention in recent years. In 2016, the EIB committed 
to providing a £700 million, 35-year loan for the construction of the Thames Tideway Tunnel – the largest ever 
infrastructure project undertaken by the UK water industry, and the largest ever loan provided for water investment 
worldwide.80 The project involves the construction of a 25 km long tunnel from West to East that will directly 
intercept the discharge from more than 30 combined sewer overflow points, in response to the urgent need to 
tackle overflows of untreated sewage into the Thames.81 The overall project cost is £4.2 billion, £1.1 billion of which 
will be financed by Thames Water, and £3.1 billion of which will be financed by Tideway, a new regulated company 
set up to design, build, commission and maintain the tunnel, through a joint venture model. The project is being 
delivered by a special purpose investment vehicle funded by a number of institutional investors, represented by 
Allianz, Dalmore, and UK pension funds. Thames Water’s contribution will fund development costs, enabling 
works, and interface works, with customers paying for the project through higher water bills.82
The EIB has also begun to support university development and expansion in London. In 2016, it agreed a £280 million 
loan to help co-fund the expansion of UCL’s Bloomsbury and East campuses. The loan represents the largest sum 
ever lent by a bank to a university, with plans to upgrade the Bloomsbury campus, refurbish the Bartlett School 
of Architecture and build a new student centre.83 This is part of a wider 10-year programme of “transforming UCL” 
worth £1.25 billion.84 The EIB loan has a maturity of 30 years and is being used by UCL alongside loans of £150 million 
over five years from a consortium of commercial banks and its own reserves and philanthropic donations.85 
18 city, transformed LONDON
Housing supply
While London’s public-private collaboration to regenerate under-optimised sites has become more proficient, 
housing demand has continued to exceed supply. London’s population has now surpassed its pre-war peak of 
8.6 million and will probably reach 10 million within 10-15 years. Difficulties and opposition to assembling sites, 
limited borough finance and capacity, and skilled construction labour shortages have been key obstacles. As the 
Opportunity Areas identified for densification are built out in the 2020s, London will need to find new sites to 
settle people.86 With the shortfall in housing supply has come affordability issues, with many low-income groups 
becoming locked out of the housing and labour markets. The scale of challenges has seen the GLA and Mayor 
create several initiatives with support from central government to facilitate land acquisition, including housing 
zones and a public sector brownfield land commission.87 
In 2016, the EIB agreed to provide £1 billion for new social housing investment across the UK, in partnership with 
the Housing Finance Corporation. Over 20,000 new affordable homes backed by the EIB are expected to be built 
under the initiative, including by large London-based housing associations.88 The EIB loan responds to several 
interlinked concerns regarding the provision of affordable housing. Firstly, it addresses the difficulty of social 
landlords to secure long-term funding for the development of new housing, as banks, previously the sector’s 
biggest providers of loans, have scaled back their lending. Secondly it aims to assuage the reduction in the amount 
of public funding available for the construction of new homes.89
Capturing value and new fiscal tools
Financial challenges have been an important spur to London proposing new tools to enhance its growth management 
abilities. The Mayor and the London Enterprise Panel have pressed hard for greater fiscal devolution to help 
London finance more of its own projects. A London Finance Commission was set up in 2013 to put forward 
suggestions for fiscal devolution. It recommended that London should be allowed to keep 12-13% of the revenues 
it generated, instead of the current 7%. Although the retention of business rates revenue will increase the predictability 
of the funding stream and provide a firmer foundation for large infrastructure projects, other larger fiscal concessions 
are not currently forthcoming.90 In the meantime, London’s governing institutions have been trying to make more 
of their property portfolios and expand the use of value capture mechanisms such as Tax Increment Financing in 
order to accelerate infrastructure development.91
 In support of fiscal innovation, in 2015 the EIB committed to providing a £480 million loan to Transport for London 
to help cover the cost of a £1.2 billion project to extend the Northern line to Battersea via Nine Elms, involving 
the construction of two new stations.92 It will be the first major extension to a tube line since that of the Jubilee 
Line in the late 1990s.93 The loan will account for nearly 50% of the cost of the project and is to be repaid through 
a combination of contributions from developments in the area that will benefit from the extension – e.g. the 
company rejuvenating Battersea Power Station – and business rates from the property developed as part of the 
Nine Elms Enterprise Zone.94 The extension is enabling the construction of tens of thousands of new homes and 
offices and helping to regenerate the last major underdeveloped site in the vicinity of central London – Vauxhall, 
Nine Elms and Battersea.95 It will also improve connections to Battersea, cutting journey times to the City and 
West End to 15 minutes, and unlock further regeneration in Wandsworth, Lambeth and Southwark.96
Meanwhile to continue to improve investor confidence, London has also set up an Infrastructure Delivery Board 
to identify long-term infrastructure needs through evidence-based scenarios. Its London Infrastructure Plan 2050 
is more than a wish-list of projects, and provides clear evidence of London’s future needs, and potential routes 
to achieve them, to signal to central government what needs to be done to manage London’s growth. A Smart 
London Board has also convened to identify and coordinate developments in “smart infrastructure”, and to leverage 
London’s tech sector to address growth and infrastructure challenges in the coming cycle.97 These innovations 
are small, incremental steps towards a more integrated and fiscally sustainable system of governance in London. 
They have gained further momentum on the back of political devolution and decentralisation in the UK, as regions 
(such as Scotland) and cities (such as Manchester) are experimenting with greater devolved powers. 
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The future?
The cycle of projects brought forward under London’s new governance model since 2000, and co-financed by 
the EIB, means that London is currently experiencing a welcome increase in capacity to catch up with existing 
demand. The EIB’s direct project loans in London between 2006 and 2016 are worth a total of £7.3 billion, and 
this has had a remarkable impact. This capacity has been at the heart of London’s recent ability to unlock new 
destinations, enhance liveability, and pursue a more compact and sustainable development model. 
Transport will also need ongoing investment as the city grows further towards 11 million and even 12 million 
people by mid-century. The London Infrastructure Board estimates that there is a need to spend 3% of London’s 
GVA on infrastructure, with a total of £1 trillion in capital investments by 2050. London will also need to find new 
ways to meet its sustainability targets around emissions and modal split.98 
Despite the progress still to be made, it is worth reflecting on London’s achievements. It has achieved world-class 
air connectivity through incremental, independent and market-driven capacity building at its five airports. The 
city’s internal infrastructure has benefited from consistent and incremental improvement to manage a constantly 
growing system. Cumulatively this has resulted in a system with significantly higher rail capacity and corridors of 
improved rail (rather than road) mobility.  
Meanwhile the civic consensus about how London could and should be competitive and sustain specialist roles 
in a European and global system has grown stronger. The ability of London’s governing institutions to enter into 
productive lending arrangements with long-term investors has improved vastly. The EIB’s contribution to the 
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